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CONCEPTUAL NATURE OF THE
CORPORATE INCOME TAX
Abstract: This paper examines a long-standing controversy about the
conceptual nature of the corporate income tax: whether it is an expense, a loss, a distribution of income, or some anomalous item. That
controversy reflects in part different theories of the accounting entity.
Despite several authoritative pronouncements stating or implying
that the tax is an expense, and despite an extensive discussion in the
academic and professional literature, the controversy has never been
fully resolved. Additionally, the tax is not characterized as an expense
in corporate financial reports. The FASB’s conceptual framework does
not resolve this controversy, nor does the impending joint FASB-IASB
revised conceptual framework.
Within the context of a coalesced (or fused) proprietary-entity
theory of the accounting entity, this paper leads to the unsurprising conclusion that the corporate income tax is an expense, albeit
an expense with some remarkable characteristics. Additionally, this
paper shows how the conceptual nature of the corporate income tax
impacts its income statement and cash flow statement reporting, and
how a better understanding of this conceptual controversy might preclude fruitless controversies over other accounting issues currently
troubling accountants and accounting standard setters.

INTRODUCTION
Most academic and practicing accountants of a certain age
are familiar with the long-standing controversy over the financial accounting for corporate income taxes. This controversy
centered on whether to ignore deferred income taxes under the
flow-through method or recognize them under some version of
interperiod income tax allocation. It was largely resolved in the
U.S. [ARB-23, 1944; APB-11, 1967; SFAS-96, 1987b; SFAS-109,
1992] and internationally [IAS-12, 1998; IAS-12 (Revised), 2006]
Acknowledgments: The author gratefully acknowledges the help of librarian
Rita Ormsby (Baruch College) in accessing many of the references. He also gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments and suggestions of Aloke Ghosh, Jan
Sweeney, two anonymous reviewers, and Dick Fleischman. One anonymous reviewer was especially helpful. Any errors, of course, are the responsibility of the
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in favor of comprehensive interperiod income tax allocation under the asset-liability method. Less well known and understood,
however, is an even older controversy about the conceptual nature of the corporate income tax: whether the tax is an expense, a
loss, a distribution of income, or some anomalous item, and how
its conceptual nature affects its reporting on the income statement and cash flow statement.1 In turn, the conceptual nature of
the income tax relates to the entity concept in accounting and to
the different theories of the accounting entity. The FASB conceptual framework does not resolve this controversy, nor does the
impending joint FASB-IASB revised conceptual framework show
much promise of resolving it [see FASB, 2008a, 2008b].
Surprisingly, the conceptual nature of the corporate income
tax has never been fully resolved [e.g., Storey, 1966, p. vii].
Most accountants and accounting standard setters say that the
corporate income tax is an expense. However, companies do
not characterize corporate income taxes as an expense and do
not report it among expenses on the income statement. Most
companies report an income statement deduction as “provision
for income taxes” or just “income taxes,” rather than as “income
tax expense.” Moreover, this deduction may not include all of
the income taxes for the period. Due to intraperiod income
tax allocation, corporate income tax may be reported partly in
discontinued operations, extraordinary gain or loss, other comprehensive income, prior period adjustment, and/or additional
paid-in capital.
Initially, this paper examines the entity concept in accounting and three theories of the accounting entity: the proprietary,
entity, and residual equity theories.2 It then examines an exten1
Actually, how the conceptual nature of the corporate income tax affects its
reporting on the cash flow statement is a relatively new controversy, at least in the
U.S. As such, this controversy may be largely unfamiliar to most U.S. accounting
academics and practitioners. See the section “Relevance of the Conceptual Nature
of Income Tax to Income Statement and Cash Flow Statement Reporting.”
2
There are three other theories of the business entity that have received considerable attention in the literature: the enterprise, commander, and the fund
theories. However, these three theories are not especially relevant to the conceptual nature of the corporate income tax. For a further discussion of the enterprise
theory, see Suojanen [1954], ASSC [1975], Hendriksen [1977, pp. 494-495], Kam
[1990, pp. 314-318], and Schroeder et al. [2009, pp. 501-502]. For a further discussion of the commander theory, see Goldberg [1965, p. 161-172], Meyer [1973, p.
163], Hendriksen [1977, pp. 497-498], Kam [1990, pp. 312-313], Wolk et al. [2004,
pp. 147-148], and Schroeder et al. [2009, p. 502]. For a further discussion of the
fund theory, see Vatter [1947], Hendriksen [1977, pp. 495-496], Kam [1990, pp.
310-312], Wolk et al. [2004, p. 147], and Schroeder et al. [2009, p. 501].
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sive literature on the conceptual nature of the corporate income
tax and how its conceptual nature affects its reporting on the
income statement and cash flow statement. This paper demonstrates that within the context of a coalesced (or fused) proprietary-entity theory of the accounting entity, the corporate income
tax is best viewed as an expense. It also shows how a better understanding of this conceptual controversy may preclude fruitless controversies over other accounting theory issues currently
troubling accountants and accounting standard setters.3
ENTITY CONCEPT
A long-standing basic postulate of accounting is the entity
concept; namely, economic activity is conducted through specific units or entities, and the financial accounting should be expressed in terms of a clearly defined entity, separate and distinct
from the parties who furnish the funds [Paton, 1922, p. 16-17;
Gilman, 1939, pp. 25-26; Paton and Littleton, 1940, p. 8; Vatter,
1947, p. 10; Moonitz, 1961, pp. 12-14; AAA, 1957, p. 537, 1965,
pp. 358-367; Ball, 1988, p. 73; IASC, 2001, para. 8].4 The entity
concept has been defined in various ways as follows:
• The distinctive unit upon which accounting is based is
the private business entity. The accountant looks upon
business operations essentially through the eyes of the
particular group of managers and owners. Accounting
classifications and procedures are significant only as
they are related to the conditions of the specific business
organization [Paton, 1922, pp. 16-17].
• A unit of business is but a means of specifying the area
of attention, a delimited and prescribed set of activities
3
Studying the history of this controversy illustrates Schumpeter’s [1954, p. 5]
concept of the filiation of ideas: “the process by which man’s efforts to understand
economic phenomena produce, improve, and pull down analytic structures in
an unending sequence.” To follow and extend Schumpeter, much more than in
other disciplines it is true in economics (and accounting) that modern problems,
methods, and results cannot be fully understood without some knowledge of how
economists and accountants have come to reason as they do. As the subsequent
discussion will demonstrate, this filiation of ideas process is especially true of the
study of the unresolved controversy over the conceptual nature of the corporate
income tax.
4
Ball [1988, pp. 8-9] distinguishes between an accounting entity and a reporting entity. The distinction arises because many organizations comprise a number
of distinct, identifiable, accounting entities but report as a single reporting entity.
Examples include parent and subsidiary companies that report as a single consolidated entity in the private sector and governmental funds that report as a single
governmental unit in the public sector.
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which give rise to the kinds of data with which accounting is to deal [Vatter, 1947, p. 10].
• A business entity is a formal or informal unit of enterprise, a collection of economic goods and services and
a group of persons, organized to accomplish certain express or implied purposes [AAA, 1957, p. 537].
• The economic unit that has control over resources accepts responsibility for making and carrying out commitments and conducts economic activity [Moonitz, 1961, p.
13].
• Anything that is viewed by an interested individual or
group as having a separable and definable existence is an
entity. The essence of an entity is its separate existence
from a particular point of view [AAA, 1965, pp. 358-359].
• A reporting entity is any unit or activity which controls
the utilization of scarce resources to generate economic
benefits or service potentials, and which is sufficiently
significant to warrant preparing general purpose financial
reports for economic decision making and accountability
[Ball, 1988, p. 73].
• A reporting entity is an entity for which there are users who rely on the financial statements as their major
source of financial information about an entity [IASC,
2001, para. 8].
• A circumscribed area of business activity of interest to
present and potential equity investors, lenders, and other
capital providers [FASB, 2008b, para. S2].
A committee of the AAA [1965, p. 359] notes that the natures
of the interests of individuals or groups which serve to identify
entities and define their boundaries are many and varied. They
may be circumscribed from a legal point of view; but they also
may be defined from an economic, social, political, aesthetic,
professional, or other point of view. Interestingly, the extant
FASB conceptual framework lacks a concept of the reporting
entity and the extant IASC Framework [2001, para. 8] discusses
it only briefly.
Zeff [1961, pp. 96-97] and Stewart [1989, pp. 98-99] note
two dimensions of the accounting entity concept, which they
refer to as the “orientation postulate”: (1) the subject of financial
statements, such as a business enterprise, which they refer to
as the first sub-postulate; and (2) the users of those statements,
such as creditors and investors, which they refer to as the second sub-postulate. Following Zeff and Stewart, in a May 29,
2008 Preliminary Views document jointly developed with the
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol36/iss2/5
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IASB,5 the FASB [2008b, para. 6] notes that general purpose
financial reports provide information about a particular entity,
which it refers to as a reporting entity; it then draws a distinction between the subject (entity) of general purpose financial
reports and the users of those reports such as equity investors
and lenders:
Those reports provide information about the entity’s
economic resources (i.e., its assets), claims on those
resources (i.e., its liabilities and equity), and the effects
of transactions and other events and circumstances that
change an entity’s resources and the claims on them. It
is the entity itself that is the subject of financial reporting, not its owners or others having an interest in the
entity.
The FASB [2008b, paras. 17, 22] notes that legal structure
helps to establish the boundaries of the reporting entity because it helps to determine which resources, claims on those
resources, and changes in those resources or claims should be
included in the entity’s financial reports. But it concludes that
a reporting entity should not be limited to activities structured
as legal entities. Rather, a reporting entity should be broadly described as a circumscribed area of business activity that would
apply to a sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, trust,
branch, or group of entities.
In a separate May 29, 2008 Exposure Draft jointly developed
with the IASB, the FASB [2008c, para. OB6] notes that an entity
obtains economic resources from capital providers in exchange
for claims on those resources. It concludes that “by virtue of
those claims, capital providers have the most critical and immediate need for general purpose financial information about the
economic resources of an entity.” Thus, the FASB concludes that
the subject of general purpose financial reports should be the
entity, not its capital providers, and the primary users of those
reports are all its capital providers, not just its equity investors.
CENTRALITY OF THE ENTITY CONCEPT
IN ACCOUNTING THEORY
As Moonitz [1961, pp. 13, 31] notes, the significance of the
entity concept to accounting is that it defines the area of interest
5
For succinctness, subsequent references in this paper are to the FASB rather
than to both the FASB and the IASB; similarly, subsequent references to joint
documents are to documents published by the FASB rather than to those published by the IASB.
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and thus narrows the possible objects and activities and their
attributes that may be selected for inclusion in financial statements. According to an AAA Committee [1965, p. 361], determining what data are relevant depends on the prior determina
tion of the reporting entity. When a definable area of economic
interest exists, it is possible to identify, accumulate, and report
financial information about that entity distinct from all other
information. This is the essence of the entity concept in accounting. Without such an entity, accounting is impossible.6 Similarly,
in its Preliminary Views, the FASB [2008b, para. 62] concludes
that “the reporting entity concept should first determine what
constitutes the ‘entity’ that is reporting, and only then should
the asset definition (and other element definitions) be applied to
that entity.”7
The primary concern of financial accounting is with entities
that represent areas of economic interest to particular individuals and groups; that is, with entities whose activities involve the
utilization of scarce resources. An economic entity could be a
business, a governmental unit, or a not-for-profit organization;
that is, any activity concerned with the administration of scarce
resources. However, this paper is concerned only with one type
of entity, the business corporation, because only this type of entity is subject to corporate income taxes.8
RELATIONSHIP OF THE ENTITY CONCEPT
TO OTHER ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS
The AAA Committee [1965, p. 360] notes that the entity concept is more fundamental than the concepts of going concern,
money measurement, and realization. The application of these
other concepts depends on the nature of the entity and the needs
of the particular interested individual or group. On the other
6
Salmonson [1969, p. 51] alludes to a certain circularity in the definition of
the accounting entity when he notes that the boundaries of the accounting entity
depend solely upon the point of view taken. Since there are many different users
of accounting information with differing points of view, there are many different
and often overlapping entities.
7
Most of the FASB Preliminary Views [2008b, paras. 29-161] document on
the reporting entity addresses the issue of consolidated versus separate parent
company financial statements. As such, that document is not otherwise relevant
to the present paper on the nature of corporate income taxes and is not further
examined.
8
Certain partnerships may elect to be taxed as corporations under the Internal Revenue Code. Most of the issues addressed in this paper also apply to such
partnerships.
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hand, these concepts do not have significance apart from the
entity. For example, the concept of going concern has no application to entities where the interest of the individual or group is
liquidation. As to the concept of money measurement, a tract of
timber may constitute an entity for which a meaningful accounting may be made in terms of board feet. Realization depends on
the business entity assumed. Intercompany profits on upstream
inventory sales are realized by the subsidiary at the time of sale
to the parent company, but are unrealized by the consolidated
entity until the inventory is resold to outsiders.
Similarly, periodic net income and its components only have
relevance to specific accounting entities. For this reason, the entity concept is more fundamental than the concept of periodic
net income. Without the accounting entity clearly defined, periodic net income cannot be measured and the conceptual nature
of its components cannot be determined.
DIFFERENT THEORIES OF ENTITY
Through the years, various authors have suggested different theories of the business entity for accounting purposes. This
paper summarizes the proprietary, entity, and residual equity
theories.9 Thereafter, it examines the conceptual nature of the
corporate income tax and how it fits into these three theories.
However, as Zeff [1961, pp. 96-97] and Stewart [1989, pp. 9899] note, none of these theories is completely satisfactory at
determining the conceptual nature of the corporate income tax
because none fully distinguishes between the subject being accounted for and the party for whose benefit the financial statements are prepared.
Proprietary Theory: According to Sprague [1907, pp. 46-50, esp.
p. 49], an early advocate, under the proprietary theory, the accounting represents a reckoning by the proprietor for his own
property.10 In this view, the fundamental accounting equation is
Assets – Liabilities = Owners’ Equity.11 The business entity is the
9
The entity concept (a business entity exists apart from the personal affairs of
its equity holders) is presumed by all three theories; they differ in how they view
the business entity [Hendriksen, 1977, p. 490].
10
Chatfield [1974, pp. 221-223] and Previts and Merino [1998, pp. 209-210]
summarize statements of the proprietary theory that predate Sprague.
11
The fundamental accounting equation is A–L=OE. However, A–L=Net Assets. Thus, OE=NA. In a 1989 monograph on the concept of equity, Kerr [1989,
pp. 33-34] suggests that although net assets and owners’ equity are measured in
the same way and will always have the same amount assigned to them, they may
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center of attention, but it is to the viewpoint of the proprietor
that the accounting is directed. Implicitly, the business enterprise is the subject being accounted for, and the proprietor is
the party for whose benefit the financial statements are prepared
[Stewart, 1989, p. 102]. Under the proprietary theory, capital
is viewed as a stock of wealth, and income is defined as the
amount that can be consumed or distributed without reducing
capital.
Chatfield [1974, p. 223] elaborates that under the proprietary theory, revenues immediately increase proprietorship, expenses immediately decrease it, and net income accrues directly
as wealth to the owner. As a result, revenues and gains can be
treated alike since all go to owner’s equity and affect it similarly.
For similar reasons, little distinction need be made between expenses and losses.
As Zeff [1961, pp. 97-105] notes, the proprietary theory was
applied initially to the medieval merchant when most commercial activity was organized as time-limited, distinguishable ventures, such as voyages or caravans. When the venture was concluded, a profit or loss could be unambiguously calculated as the
difference between the merchant’s wealth at the beginning and
conclusion of the venture. At that time, accountants did not separate business from personal affairs; their main concern was ascertaining the amount of changes in the merchant’s wealth. The
merchant was both the subject and beneficiary of the financial
statements. However, with the evolution of capitalism, economic
activity became organized increasingly as continuing business
enterprises rather than as discontinuous trading ventures. Concurrently, accountants adopted the going-concern assumption,
decided to separate business from personal affairs, and applied
the proprietary theory to sole proprietorships and partnerships.
Implicitly, the proprietorship or partnership became the subject
and the proprietor/partners became the primary beneficiary(ies)
of the financial statements.
However, the proprietary theory has long been applied to
corporations by looking through the corporate veil and considering the stockholders collectively as the proprietary interest
[Hatfield, 1909, pp. 144-183, esp. pp. 145-146]. The accounting
thereupon becomes a reckoning by management for the stockbe regarded as separate concepts: “The concept of net assets is appropriate when
attention is centered on the resources which are available to an entity whilst owners’ equity is appropriate when attention is focused on the owners’ interest in the
enterprise.”
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holders’ property. To use Zeff’s construct [1961, pp. 105-106], the
corporation became the subject and the stockholders became
the primary beneficiary of the financial statements.
In criticizing the proprietary theory, Previts and Merino
[1998, pp. 221-222] note that “the business entity concept (the
fact that the legal entity existed apart from its ownership), was
not questioned, only ignored, by proprietarists.” Perhaps a more
accurate criticism of the proprietary theory is that its advocates
did not emphasize the distinction between the corporation as
the subject and the stockholders as the primary beneficiary of
the financial accounting. Nevertheless, the accounting for the
corporation is completely separate from the accounting for
the personal wealth of the stockholders under the proprietary
theory.
Schroeder et al. [2009, pp. 498-499] find “significant [extant]
accounting policies that can be justified only through acceptance
of the proprietary theory.” Ball [1988, p. 89] concludes that the
proprietary theory predominates in practice, at least in Aus
tralia. Similarly, Hendriksen [1977, pp. 489-490] notes that the
proprietary theory is implied in many extant accounting practices and terminology relating to corporations. For example, the
net income of a corporation is often referred to as net income to
stockholders.
Under the proprietary theory, revenues and expenses are
simply increases or decreases in stockholders’ equity, respectively. As a result, net income equals the change in stockholders’
equity over the period other than changes due to additional contributions from or distributions to stockholders. Consistently,
under the proprietary theory, corporate income taxes and interest on debt are viewed as expenses to be deducted from revenues
to determine net income, whereas dividends are withdrawals of
capital.12
Entity Theory: As Zeff [1961, pp. 106-107] notes, with the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation [see
also Berle and Means, 1932] came another shift in accounting
emphasis towards the enterprise itself and away from the stock12
See Hatfield [1927, pp. 373-374] and Moonitz [1957, pp. 175-176]. Sprague
did not address the accounting for corporate income taxes in his book, which bore
1907 and 1908 copyrights, when there was no federal corporate income tax in the
U.S. The current federal corporate income tax emanates from legislation enacted
in 1909, reaffirmed by the 16th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1913, and
subsequently amended. A federal corporate income tax was enacted in 1862 to
help finance the Civil War, but it was repealed in 1872.
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holders as the collective owners. But this shift was not complete
under the proprietary theory, so it was argued, for under the proprietary theory, the stockholders’ viewpoint remains the focus
of the financial statements [see also Gilman, 1939, p. 48]. The
entity theory, to be distinguished from the entity concept and
the entity theory of consolidated financial statements [Moonitz,
1944],13 was developed ostensibly to make this shift in emphasis
more complete.
Paton [1922, pp. 84-89] is perhaps the first American to offer a comprehensive statement of the entity theory.14 According
to Paton, the business entity is not just the center of attention.
Rather, the viewpoint of the business entity is the viewpoint to
which the accounting should be directed. Under the entity theory, long-term debt and capital stock are considered more similar
than different. Long-term creditors and stockholders are considered both separate and apart from the business entity itself
(pp. 76-79). In this view, the fundamental accounting equation
is Assets = Liabilities + Stockholders’ Equity. As Kerr [1989, p. 5]
notes, the distinction between liabilities and stockholders’ equity
is “one of degree rather than of fundamental differences.”
Under the entity theory, according to Paton [1922, p. 259],
net income is the “increase in all [creditor and stockholder]
equities,” and coincides with the viewpoint of the corporate
manager:
To the manager, the particular manner in which the
company is capitalized is a matter entirely outside the
determination of operating net income. . . . Net operating revenue [income] is then the excess of values
13
Under Moonitz’s entity theory of consolidated financial statements, a parent and subsidiary are viewed as one economic entity with two groups of stock
holders, the controlling stockholders of the parent company and the noncontrolling stockholders of the subsidiary. The FASB [2007b] largely adopted the entity
theory of consolidated financial statements in SFAS No. 160. Prior practice was
largely based on the parent company theory of consolidated financial statements.
Unlike the three more pervasive theories of the accounting entity, the parent
company and entity theories of consolidated financial statements apply solely to
consolidated financial statements. Additionally, the same issues concerning the
conceptual nature of income taxes and interest on debt arise under both theories
of consolidated financial statements.
14
Chatfield [1974, pp. 223-224] and Previts and Merino [1998, p. 222] summarize earlier statements of the entity theory. Interestingly, Paton [1922, pp. 61-68]
espouses a managerial point of view, not the entity theory. However, numerous
writers [Husband, 1938, pp. 242 et passim; Gilman, 1939, pp. 46-54; Vatter, 1947,
pp. 5-7; Stewart, 1989, p. 102] refer to Paton’s managerial point of view as his
entity theory. This paper continues that practice.
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received over purchased assets utilized in connection
with product sold, and represents the increase in capital
to be apportioned or distributed among all individuals
or interests who have committed cash funds or other
property to the undertaking.
Consistently, interest on long-term debt is viewed as a distribution of income similar to dividends on stock [Paton, 1922,
p. 267]; neither is an expense to be deducted from revenues to
determine net income under the entity theory.
In commenting on the entity theory, Chatfield [1974, pp.
225-226] elaborates that “if the corporation is functionally separate from its owners and creditors then it, not they, should be
the center of accounting interest,” which implies a wider view
not only of the business but of accounting activities generally.
Additionally, Chatfield suggests that “the entity theory emphasizes corporate income and a more nearly economic idea of
income measurement.” He notes that unlike the proprietary
theory, under the entity theory:
Revenues and expenses are no longer simply increases
or decreases in stockholder’s equity. Revenues are compensation for services provided by the firm. Expenses
measure the cost of services consumed in obtaining this
revenue. Profit accrues to the corporation, not to its
owners or creditors. Its disposition is up to the entity;
income distribution is distinct from income finding [determination].
Staubus [1952, pp. 105-107] offers a different version of the
entity theory from a managerial point of view. Under Staubus’
version, “insofar as managers have a viewpoint towards the income of business that can be distinguished from the viewpoint
of owners, distributions to creditors and owners, like distributions to employees [and taxes], are costs [expenses].” Wolk et al.
[2004, pp. 144-145] observes that under orthodox entity theory:
. . . owners’ equity accounts do not represent their
interest as owners but simply their claims as equity
holders. Similarly, net income does not belong to the
owners although the amount is credited to the claims
of equity holders after all other claims have been satisfied. Income does not belong to capital providers until
dividends are declared or interest becomes due. In
measuring income, both interest and dividends represent distributions of income to providers of capital.
Husband [1938, pp. 246-247, 1954, pp. 555-556] adds that under
Published by eGrove, 2009
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a consistent application of the entity theory, stock dividends are
income to the stockholders, although he finds this to be an inherent defect of the entity theory.
Zeff [1961, pp. 187-188] distinguishes Paton’s version of the
entity theory from Staubus’ version (and subsequent elaborations) as traceable to a disagreement over the meaning of the
word “entity”: Staubus views the managers or the entity itself
as the parties for whom the financial statements are prepared,
whereas Paton does not establish either the managers or the
entity as the dominant beneficiary of financial statements. Zeff
characterizes Staubus’ conception of the entity as the “institutional-entity view”; he characterizes Paton’s managerial view of
the entity as the “distributional-entity view.” Because management acts in a fiduciary capacity in reporting to outsiders, not to
itself, Zeff [1961, p. 205] concludes that the distributional-entity
view of Paton is to be preferred over the institutional-entity view
of Staubus.15
Zeff [1961, pp. 129-140, 188] also notes that, just as with the
proprietary theory, it is useful under the entity theory to distinguish between the subject being accounted for and the party for
whose benefit the financial statements are prepared. Implicitly,
under Paton’s conception of the entity theory, the business enterprise is the subject being accounted for and its capital suppliers, both creditors and stockholders, are the parties for whose
benefit the financial statements are prepared [see also Stewart,
1989, p. 102].
Clark [1993, p. 26] suggests that because modern capital
structure theory literature supports the notion that financing
activity impacts operating cash flow and vice versa, corporate
financial policy appears to affect firm value. Although this does
not invalidate the idea that both bondholders and stockholders
supply capital to the firm, it does raise doubts that debt can be
viewed in the same light as equity as under the entity theory.
Previts and Merino [1998, p. 213] add that although many view
Paton’s entity theory as an advance in conceptualizing the accounting entity, its underlying assumptions are inconsistent with
private property rights and have never been accepted: “Accounting theory today continues to adopt a proprietary focus; that is,
managers should maximize stockholders’ wealth, rather than an
entity focus.”
15
Staubus’ view and its elaborations is also a decidedly uncommon interpretation of the entity theory. Additionally, Staubus abandons his version of the entity
theory in favor of the residual equity theory, discussed in the next section.
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According to Paton’s original formulation [1922, pp. 180181, italics added], where the long-term creditors and stockholders are implicitly the beneficiaries of the financial statements,
the corporate income tax is viewed as a distribution of income
akin to dividends on stock:
Taxes in general constitute a coerced levy on net earnings (or capital if no earnings are available) . . . The
state virtually has a latent prior equity in the properties
of every business enterprise; private ownership is not
absolute. . . . Income and excess-profits taxes furnish,
of course, a clear case. Here the state is levying specifically upon net earnings (derived in general from the
stockholders’ standpoint) and consequently such levies
from an accounting view represent distributions of net
revenue.
However, Paton also notes that the corporate income tax
could fall into one of four classifications – an expense, a loss,
a distribution, or an anomalous item. He suggests that the tax
“can best be considered a loss . . . or a distribution . . .; it cannot reasonably be viewed as an expense.” Similarly, Paton and
Littleton [1940, p. 102] conclude that “interest and income taxes
. . . are not costs of producing the economic service which accounts for the revenue from sales.” But as a result of the higher
tax rates of the 1940s, Paton [1943, p. 13] changed his mind and
concluded that all taxes, both income taxes and property taxes
are not an expense, loss, or distribution of income, but rather
are an anomalous item that should be deducted from revenues
to compute corporate net income.
Accordingly, the entity theory is subject to different interpretations. The treatment of corporate income tax under the entity
theory is also subject to several interpretations, even by Paton,
its developer. However, the prevailing interpretation is that the
corporate income tax is a distribution of income under the entity theory.
Residual Equity Theory: As suggested initially by Staubus [1959],
under the residual equity theory, the fundamental accounting
equation becomes Assets – Specific Equities = Residual Equity,
where specific equities include those of creditors and preferred
stockholders. Staubus [1959, p. 8, italics in originial] defines
residual equity as “the equitable interest in organization assets
which will absorb the effect upon those assets of any economic
event that no interested party has specifically agreed to absorb”;
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the residual equity holders “are that group of equity claimants
whose rights are superseded by all other claimants.” Under the
residual equity theory, common stockholders are viewed as having a residual equity in the income of the business and in the
net assets upon final liquidation. According to Staubus, the focal
point of investors’ interest in the income statement should be
the change in the residual equity.
Meyer [1973, p. 117] notes that advocates of the residual
equity theory consider the proprietary theory inadequate because it treats as identical the interests of various stockholder
groups that are basically antagonistic to one another. Such antagonism results from the desire of the lowest ranking investors
to minimize returns to the highest ranking investors while the
latter seek to maximize these returns. The entity theory may be
similarly criticized for ignoring the antagonism of creditors and
stockholders.
Under the residual equity theory, because the common
stockholders are viewed as having a residual equity in the income of the business and in the net assets upon final liquidation,
the income statement should report the income available to the
residual equity holders after all prior claims are met, including interest on debt, income taxes, and dividends to preferred
stockholders.16 Accordingly, income taxes and dividends to preferred stockholders are more akin to expenses than to income
distributions. As a result, Meyer [1973, pp. 117-118] and Wolk
et al. [2004, p. 146] suggest that the residual equity theory is a
variant of the proprietary and the entity theories. Zeff [1961, p.
188] characterizes Staubus’ residual equity theory as having the
entity as the subject and the common stockholders as the principal beneficiary of the financial statements.
Although U.S. and international accounting standard setters
have not adopted the residual equity theory, it has considerable
conceptual appeal as a more accurate description of the modern
publicly owned corporation than either the proprietary or entity theories. Its conceptual appeal stems from its treatment of
preferred stock as more similar to debt than to common stock.
Moreover, because the FASB and IASB tentatively favor a basic

16
Hendriksen [1977, p. 493] notes an alternative and decidedly uncommon
interpretation of the residual equity theory. Because the common stockholders’
only claim against the corporation is to receive dividends when and if declared,
the residual equity in capital is not assigned to the residual equity holders. Both
the initial capital supplied by the common stockholders and the retained earnings
are equity of the corporation in itself.
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ownership approach to the definition of equity, future adoption
of the residual equity theory is not inconceivable.17
The conceptual nature of the corporate income tax is the
same under the proprietary and residual equity theories; the
income tax is an expense to be deducted from revenues to derive
net income available to all equity holders under the proprietary
theory and to residual equity holders under the residual equity
theory. For this reason, advocates of the proprietary and residual
equity theories suggest some of the same arguments for viewing
the income tax as an expense. Moreover, the literature on the
conceptual nature of the corporate income tax is usually in the
context of the proprietary and entity theories, with little mention
of the residual equity theory. This paper continues that practice
in order to minimize duplication.
AUTHORITATIVE PRONOUNCEMENTS ON
NATURE OF CORPORATE INCOME TAX
Since 1944, several U.S. authoritative pronouncements
group corporate income tax with expenses and/or state or imply
that it is an expense. However, these pronouncements do not
explain why the tax is an expense.
For example, in Accounting Research Bulletin (ARB) No.
23 [1944, para. 3], the Committee on Accounting Procedure
(CAP) states that “income taxes are an expense which should be
allocated, when necessary and practicable, to income and other
accounts, as other expenses are allocated.” That view was reaffirmed in 1953 by the CAP in ARB No. 43 [ch. 10, para. 4]. The
CAP’s successor, the Accounting Principles Board (APB), reconfirmed that the corporate income tax is an expense in Opinion
No. 11 [1967, para. 12(a)]. Similarly, the successor to the APB,
the FASB, assumes that corporate income tax is an expense in
SFAS No. 96 [1987b, paras. 26-28] and again in SFAS No. 109
[1992, paras. 35, 45-46]. However, all of these authoritative pronouncements merely assert or assume that the corporate income
tax is an expense rather than a loss, a distribution of income, or
something else without explaining why.
17
See FASB, Preliminary Views [2007a, paras. 16-49]. Under this basic ownership approach, a financial instrument is classified as equity only if it is the most
subordinated interest in an entity and if it entitles its holder to a share of the
entity’s net assets after all higher priority claims have been satisfied. All other
financial instruments, such as forward contracts, options, and convertible debt,
are classified as liabilities or assets. As a result, only the lowest residual interest in
the entity is classified as equity. The basic ownership approach is fully consistent
with the residual equity theory.
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Even in its conceptual framework statements, the FASB discusses the nature of the corporate income tax only superficially.
Financial Accounting Concept Statement (SFAC) No. 3 [1980,
para. 65] and SFAC No. 6 [1985, para. 80] define expenses as
“outflows or other using up of assets or incurrences of liabilities
(or a combination of both) from delivering or producing goods,
rendering services, or carrying out other activities that constitute the entity’s ongoing major or central operations.” Moreover,
in discussing the characteristics of expenses, SFAC 6 [1985,
para. 81, italics added] notes explicitly that income taxes are an
expense:
Expenses represent actual or expected cash outflows (or
the equivalent) that have occurred or will eventuate as
a result of the entity’s ongoing major or central operations. The assets that flow out or are used or the liabilities that are incurred . . . may be of various kinds – for
example, units of product delivered or produced, employees’ services used, kilowatt hours of electricity used
to light an office building, or taxes on current income.
In a fundamental sense, this SFAC 6 discussion of the characteristics of expenses defines away the controversy as to the conceptual nature of income taxes without indicating the reasons why
income taxes are an expense rather than a loss, a distribution of
income, or something else.
Additionally, SFAC 6 seems to distinguish between other
expenses and income taxes as if to imply that income taxes may
not really be an expense. For example, it [para. 137] defines
transaction as “an external event involving transfer of something of value (future economic benefit) between two (or more)
entities,” and distinguishes an exchange and a nonreciprocal
transfer. In an exchange, both entities receive and sacrifice
value, such as purchases or sales of goods or services, which ultimately become expenses or losses. In a nonreciprocal transfer,
an entity incurs a liability or transfers an asset to another entity
or receives an asset or cancellation of a liability without directly
receiving or giving value in exchange. Importantly, SFAC 6 notes
that impositions of taxes, like investments by owners, distributions to owners, gifts, and charitable or educational contributions given or received, are nonreciprocal transfers. In the context of different types of transactions, therefore, income taxes
are in some ways more similar to distributions to owners than
to expenses. So the conceptual nature of the corporate income
tax has not been fully resolved by SFAC 3 or SFAC 6.
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Interestingly, at one time, the SEC [1945, p. 151] suggested
that the corporate income tax might be viewed more appropriately as a distribution of income rather than as an expense:
It is readily apparent that normal and excess profits
taxes are computed as a part of taxable income. Unlike
most expenses they exist if, and only if, there is net taxable income before any deduction for such taxes. There
is much to be said therefore for the position that true
income taxes are in the nature of a share of profits taken by the government. If it is desired to place emphasis
on the necessity of deducting them in order to arrive at
net profit available to shareholders, they may perhaps
be called an expense – but in such cases they represent
a very special class of expense, one that is incurred only
by the making of net taxable income.
However, the SEC has always required corporations to treat
the corporate income tax as a separate deduction from revenue
to derive periodic net income. At no time did the SEC either
require or permit the treatment of the corporate income tax as a
distribution of income rather than as a deduction in computing
periodic net income.
In summary, authoritative pronouncements in the U.S. treat
the corporate income tax as an expense or deduction in calculating periodic net income, but without adequately explaining why.
NATURE OF CORPORATE INCOME TAX
UNDER DIFFERENT THEORIES OF ENTITY
Through the years, numerous commentators have analyzed
the conceptual nature of the corporate income tax, treating
it either as an expense, a loss, a distribution of income, or an
anomalous item, along the lines suggested by Paton [1922, p.
181]. The most common question is whether the income tax is
an expense or a distribution of income. Many of these analyses
have implicitly presumed one theory of the reporting entity,
often without specifying which theory is presumed or to whom
the financial statements are directed.
Income Tax as Expense or Distribution of Income: Paton [1922, p.
181], the first American writer to advocate the entity theory, suggests that the corporate income tax is a distribution of income,
not an expense. Another early advocate of the entity theory
[Seeger, 1924, pp. 103] elaborates that because the government
is a partner in production and as such is entitled to a share of
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the wealth produced, the income tax is a distribution of income,
not an expense, and should not be deducted from revenue to determine entity net income.
Dewhirst [1972, pp. 42-43] also argues that the income tax
is a capital distribution, which he implies is the same as an
income distribution. He defines expense as the productive use
of resources to generate revenue, where a causal and purposive
relationship exists between expense and revenue; he defines loss
as the unproductive use of resources. He notes that no relationship exists between income taxes and the receipt of government
services or revenues earned. Because the income tax does not
involve either the productive or unproductive use of resources
or services to generate revenue, Dewhirst concludes that the income tax is neither an expense nor a loss. He also assumes that
it is not a new category of revenue deduction. By a process of
elimination, Dewhirst concludes that the income tax is a capital
distribution.
Other writers are more circumspect in discussing whether
the income tax is an expense or a distribution of income. For
example, in discussing whether taxes of railroads are expenses
or distributions of income, Hatfield [1927, p. 374] notes:
It is impossible to say that any one of these views is
absolute and exclusive. . . . If the stockholder has his
dividends lessened by the taxes paid, but in all probability would pay no taxes were his funds invested, say,
in bonds or mortgages, the taxes are, from his point of
view, in no sense a distribution of profits. But where
there is an income tax uniformly enforced, and the payment of taxes by the [rail]road works merely as a stoppage of that part of the income, it is not illogical to consider the tax as a distribution of part of the net profits
derived from operating the road.
Similarly, Greer [1945, p. 96-97] notes that whether the income tax is an expense or a distribution of income depends on
one’s viewpoint. If the government is viewed as a part-owner, the
income tax is a distribution of income; if it is viewed as a supplier of goods or services, it is an expense. According to Greer,
the government is better viewed as a part-owner; the absence of
government equity on the balance sheet reflects that its equity
“is not in the property, but in the earnings, of the corporation.”
Paton [1946, p. 86] finds persuasiveness in Greer’s concept
of the government as a part-owner that shares profits with
stockholders. However, because the government makes no
investment, and because taxes are a coerced levy, Paton finds
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol36/iss2/5
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it unrealistic to view the government as an equity holder. Zeff
[1961, pp. 155-156] is still more critical; he suggests that viewing the government as an equity holder that does not contribute
funds is an ethereal notion:
Creditors . . . and stockholders seek equity in profits
. . . but they also furnish funds. To the extent that it is
desirable that ‘equities’ consist of a collection of homogeneous ‘rights,’ inclusion therein of a ‘right’ that is
not attended by a contribution of capital is not to be
recommended. By such inclusion, a party represented
as realizing an infinite return on investment would be
permitted to distort the aggregate return on investment
of those parties who do provide some capital.
In support of treating the corporate income tax as a distribution of income, some entity theorists [e.g., Hill, 1957, p. 357]
contend that its incidence is upon the stockholders, that the
corporation in effect is paying a tax on the stockholders’ income.
Proprietary theorists [e.g., Hendriksen, 1958, p. 218] contend
to the contrary, maintaining that the incidence of the tax is
elsewhere. To add to the confusion, both Hendriksen [1965, p.
369] and Li [1961, p. 266] maintain that the incidence of the tax
alone does not conclusively determine its conceptual nature, i.e.,
whether it is an expense or a distribution of income. Moreover,
it has long been recognized [Harberger, 1962; Gravelle, 1995;
Auerbach, 2005] that the incidence of the corporate income tax
has not been determined conclusively either in theory or empirically.
Both proprietary and entity theorists recognize certain obvious differences between corporate income taxes and expenses
in general. Proprietary theorists [e.g., Hendriksen, 1958, p. 217]
maintain that the similarities outweigh the differences, whereas
entity theorists [e.g., Paton, 1922, pp. 179-181] argue to the
contrary. More specifically, proprietary theorists like Hendriksen [1965, p. 465] argue that income taxes, like other expenses,
represent payment for services required by the entity to further
its operations; they may be associated with the right to conduct
a profitable corporation in a favorable business environment,
certainly a valuable service supplied by the government. Entity
theorists like Paton reject this contention, arguing instead that
income taxes are coerced levies largely outside of managerial
control, representing the latent prior beneficial interest of the
government in every business entity. Moreover, these levies do
not further the operations of the entity. To substantiate this
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 osition, entity theorists note that unlike most expenses, income
p
taxes are not apportioned in accordance with services received
from the government; rather, they are apportioned and contingent on the existence of taxable income although the entity presumably receives the same services regardless of the amount of
its taxable income and any tax thereon. Accordingly, entity theorists contend that income taxes cannot be viewed as measuring
the value of services and, later, a cost of production or expense.
Additionally, although he views the corporate income tax as
an expense and not as a distribution of income, Sprouse [1957,
p. 374, italics added] notes that:
. . . the imposition of income taxes might be looked
upon as a method of siphoning off a substantial portion of corporate income to finance the [government]
services. . . . From this point of view, income taxes might
well be treated as a distribution of corporate income.
. . . This necessarily assumes that the incidence of the
corporate income tax falls upon the incorporated institution; that the tax is not shifted forward in the form of
higher prices for the corporation’s product or shifted
backward in the form of lower prices for the factors of
production.
In refutation, some proprietary theorists, including Sprouse,
argue that income taxes are an expense, even under a consistent
application of the entity theory:
The state and federal governments are not corporate investors. Accordingly, the number of dollars which could
be distributed to corporate equity holders without impairing their cumulative investment is clearly adversely
affected by the imposition of income taxes. . . . Income
taxes are expenses . . . an unavoidable cost of general
business operations during a given revenue period.
Other proprietary theorists [e.g., Kelley, 1958, p. 214] note
that to argue that income taxes are not a cost of carrying on
a business enterprise and a determinant of net income “is to
propose a concept of corporate net income which is illogical,
contrary to common sense and contrary to universal business
practice.”
Taxes, whether levied on property or on income, constitute a basic cost of carrying on a business, which must
be paid to the all-powerful sovereignty, the State, for
the privilege of remaining in business. In no true sense
is the State a partner in the enterprise; it is a sovereign
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol36/iss2/5
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demanding periodic payments for the privilege of carrying on the activities of the corporation.
Still other proprietary theorists [e.g., Solomon, 1966, p. 201]
argue that the non-proportionality of income taxes to services
received or anticipated is irrelevant to their conceptual nature
Some degree of government activity is beneficial to earning
revenue by providing something of value, if only a favorable environment. Another proprietary theorist [McLaren, 1947, p. 164]
notes that:
The Federal government is still intended to be the
servant of the business public – not the master; it con
tributes no capital, shares no losses, and is not an
equity holder. Viewed realistically, income taxes must be
regarded as a cost of doing business; they are payments
for protective services rendered by the government
which, over the long term, enhance or at least preserve
business opportunities.
And still other proprietary theorists [e.g., Mateer, 1965, pp.
584-585] argue that the corporate income tax may be viewed
as merely one way of allocating the cost of government among
some of the corporations benefited. Even some entity theorists
[e.g., Zeff, 1961, p. 168] conclude that income taxes “are the cost
of establishing and maintaining a free economy within which
private enterprise can effectively attempt to attain profitable
results. Translated into microeconomic terms, income taxes are
thus a cost of a firm’s revenues.”
Furthermore, the method of measuring the tax, its contingency on taxable income, is held by other proprietary theorists
[e.g., Sprouse, 1957, p. 375; Moonitz and Jordan, 1963, pp. 477489] to be irrelevant to its conceptual nature. Employee bonuses
are often contingent on income; nevertheless, they are properly characterized as an expense, not a distribution of income.18
18
It has been noted that, consistent with the proprietary theory, the corporation might be viewed as an agent for its stockholders in paying the tax that is
really a tax on the income of the stockholders; hence, the tax is a distribution of
income, not an expense [Hendriksen, 1965, p. 395]. However, the incidence of the
corporate income tax has not been determined conclusively either in theory or
empirically, and the incidence of the tax alone does not conclusively determine its
conceptual nature. Additionally, this is a decidedly minority interpretation of the
proprietary theory. Blackie [1947, p. 203] rejects a similar notion that the corporate income tax is really a tax on customers that is collected by the corporation on
behalf of the government: “Such an idea rests on a cost-plus method of reasoning
which assumes that price is the product of an arithmetical process rather than the
result of economic forces which frequently defy the adding machine. The corpora-
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Even some advocates of the entity theory take this position. For
example, Zeff [1961, p. 167] aptly notes:
. . . officers of many large corporations are voted bonuses by the directors on the basis of the profitability of the
year’s operations. Are these bonuses, therefore, a ‘distribution of income?’ The point of reductio ad absurdum
would be reached very soon as more and more cost factors were found to have an affinity toward ‘income.’
Indeed, even some advocates of the entity theory contend
that the corporate income tax is an expense. For example, Li
[1961, pp. 265-268, esp. p. 266] argues that, consistent with
the entity theory, the corporate income tax is best viewed as an
expense. The tax is imposed upon a corporation because it is a
separate entity and because it enjoys the privileges and advantages of being a separate entity. Because the tax is directed at
the corporation, it should be considered an expense of corporate
administration. Hendriksen [1982, p. 165] also argues against
viewing the income tax as a distribution, even if one otherwise
subscribes to the entity theory. However, viewing income tax
as an expense is not the prevailing interpretation of the entity
theory.
Equally important, proprietary theorists [e.g., McLaren,
1947, p. 164; Moonitz, 1957, p. 175] note that income taxes
are considered an expense by businessmen themselves and
are viewed as such in the business decision-making process.
Walgenbach [1959, pp. 582-583] notes that the courts and most
rate-making regulatory agencies also adopted this viewpoint.19
For many years, the majority of the accounting profession has
also adopted this view, at least as reflected in authoritative
pronouncements on the financial accounting for income taxes.
Income Tax as Expense or Anomalous Item: Most of the early
writers debated whether the income tax is an expense or a
distribution of income. However, following Paton’s [1922, p.
181] suggestion, some writers debated whether the income tax
tion does not have the power to pay taxes or wages or any other cost without limit.
The U.S. federal income tax – levied on the corporation as such – is neither a sales
tax upon the customers nor a personal tax upon the stockholders.”
19
In general, the courts have regarded the regular corporate income tax as an
expense for determining net income, and the excess profits tax has been similarly
regarded for ordinary net income determination purposes, but not generally for
the rate-making purposes of the regulatory agencies [Walgenbach, 1959, pp. 582583].
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is an expense or an anomalous item, often without considering
whether it might be a loss or a distribution of income instead.
For example, Chambers [1968, pp. 104-105] argues that
income taxes are not an expense because they are not levied
in proportion to the benefits received by governments. He also
argues that the income tax is not an excise tax on the right to
operate and earn income because loss companies also have that
right but pay no income tax. Additionally, Chambers notes that
income taxes are levied on taxable income, which differs funda
mentally from accounting income. Because taxable income
reflects fiscal and policy functions of governments, Chambers
concludes that income taxes “can only be regarded as a form of
discriminatory expropriation.”
Barton [1970, pp. 4-8] supplements Chambers’ argument
that the income tax is an expropriation. He suggests that to
understand the nature of the corporate income tax, one must examine its purpose and the manner in which it is levied. Barton
notes that income taxes are levied on taxable income in order
to raise revenue to finance government activities. The measurement of taxable income reflects government policies of raising
revenue according to ability-to-pay, influencing the allocation of
productive resources, and making the tax laws easy to administer. According to Barton, because it reflects government policy
objectives and administrative simplifications, taxable income
need have no relation to accounting income. As a result, corporate income tax is not related to specific transactions. For these
reasons, Barton argues that corporate income taxes do not possess any of the characteristics of operating expenses.
Like Chambers, Barton also disputes the view that the income tax is an expense because it represents a payment for the
right to conduct a profitable business in a favorable economic
environment. He notes that unlike expenses, income taxes are
not proportional to services received from the government.
Some of the largest companies pay relatively little tax because
of various tax incentives though they often use more public
services than smaller companies. He also disputes the view that
income tax is an expense even though it represents a cost of conducting a profitable business.
Additionally, Barton objects to the view that income tax is
an expense because it fits the definition of expense as a reduction in proprietorship other than repayments to owners. Barton
[1971, p. 173] finds that definition of expense to be too broad
because it hides several important differences between items
in the expense category and does not indicate the reason for
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i ncurring expenses. For example, the definition lumps income
taxes (which reflect the success of a company’s operations), with
sales taxes and bad debts (which relate to sales), and with wages
and payroll taxes (which relate to the resources acquired by
management to generate revenue).
However, Baylis [1971, pp. 161-165] aptly refutes Barton’s
arguments that the income tax is not an expense. He finds that
Barton’s criticism of the all-inclusive definition of expense does
not mean that income tax is not an expense. He also finds Barton’s and Chambers’ term “expropriation” unappealing “because
of its obvious link with the term appropriation.”
In responding to Baylis, Barton [1971, pp. 173-174] argues
that the real issue is whether the expense classification is the
most useful one available. Instead of defining expense broadly as
a reduction in proprietorship other than repayments to owners,
he favors classifying non-owner outlays as revenue deductions,
expenses of generating revenue, non-operating losses, and expropriations of profit. Barton argues that this four-way, mutually
exclusive classification is more informative than classifying all
non-owner outlays as expense.
Baylis [1971, pp. 162-164] counters that the government
indirectly serves business by providing the valuable benefit of
a favorable environment in which all may operate profitably
and that income taxes need not be levied proportionate to the
benefits received to justify classifying them as an expense. He
observes that trade association membership fees are an expense
although a larger company may pay twice as much as a smaller
company without receiving twice the benefits. Similarly, the
benefits received from paying income taxes may not be proportionate to the amount paid. “These items [trade association
membership fees and income taxes] qualify as expenses; they
certainly couldn’t be called distributions of income.”
Moreover, Baylis notes that, like temperature, income taxes
are an environmental cost. If a business chooses to work in a
cold locale, it would incur more heating costs. Both heating
costs and income taxes are environmental costs of business
operations; hence, both are expenses properly charged against
operating revenues.
Baylis maintains that for accounting purposes, the classification of an expenditure is determined by the reason why the
payer makes that expenditure, not by the motives or desires of
the payee:
To suggest that income taxes are not an expense because
the government has imposed them to provide revenue
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for its own purposes, or to help reach desired fiscal and
economic goals or to achieve a redistribution of income
within the economy, and so on, is the same as saying
that wages paid to an employee should only be treated
as wages in the accounts [of the employer] if that employee utilizes his wages in some specified manner.
Finally, Baylis argues that the conceptual nature of the tax
does not change because some companies pay more income
taxes than other companies or because of the way the tax is computed. He disputes Barton’s contention that income taxes are not
an expense because they are not a cost deliberately incurred in
anticipation of future benefits. He notes that some other costs
besides income taxes, such as bad debts, are not deliberately
incurred, are not a result of managerial choice, are not controllable, but are appropriately classified as expenses. Additionally,
the fact that income taxes are compulsory does not demonstrate
that they are compulsory distributions of income rather than
expenses. Rather, Baylis argues that companies presumably have
chosen to accept compulsory income taxes as a condition of being able to conduct business in a particular country.20
Wheeler and Galliart [1974, pp. 51-63] also argue that the
corporate income tax is an anomalous item rather than an
expense. They reject the argument that whether the corporate
income tax is an income distribution or an expense depends
on whether its burden falls on stockholders or someone else.
First, Wheeler and Galliart note that the tax may be something
other than an expense or income distribution. Second, they
suggest that who bears the burden of the tax is an unresolved
question. They conclude that previous studies and authoritative pronouncements offer no help in determining the nature
of the income tax because they assume the problem away. They
also argue that the various theories of the accounting entity do
not determine the conceptual nature of the income tax because
these theories lead to either ambiguous or contradictory conclusions [see also, Dewhirst, 1972, p. 44].
Rather, Wheeler and Galliart attempt to ascertain the conceptual nature of the corporate income tax by examining its
essential characteristics. They argue that the corporate income
tax is not a payment for the right to conduct business; that there
20
In support of this choice by companies, one could also cite the trend starting in the 1990s of American companies moving headquarters offshore to avoid
federal income taxes. Presumably, those companies that do not move their headquarters offshore choose to continue to be subject to federal income taxes.

Published by eGrove, 2009

25

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 36 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 5
56

Accounting Historians Journal, December 2009

is no direct relationship between the benefits a corporation
receives from income taxes and the amount of income taxes
paid; that the government, in its role as a tax collector, has no
shareholder interest in a corporation; that the income tax is
not a franchise fee; and that the income tax is a compulsory
contribution. Wheeler and Galliart also note that an income distribution such as dividends is generally voluntary whereas the
income tax is not so, hence is not a distribution. Additionally,
although the income tax results from a combination of activities
that are profit-directed, they argue that the income tax is neither
an expense nor a loss because it does not generate revenue. By a
process of elimination, they conclude that “because the income
tax fails to qualify as a profit distribution, an expense, or a loss,
it is an anomalous item.”
Interestingly, as a result of the vastly higher tax rates of the
1940’s, Paton [1943, p. 13] concluded that the income tax is an
anomalous item rather than an income distribution:
The terms ‘net income’ and ‘net profit,’ by long usage,
imply the amount of earnings available for owners or
investors, and are not at all appropriate to describe figures which may be eight or ten times the size of actual
net corporate income or profits. As long as income and
profits taxes were of relatively small amount the reporting of such taxes as a prior participation in the net income produced by the corporation was not particularly
objectionable; under present conditions such reporting
may be definitely misleading. To report ‘net profit before
income and profits taxes’ of $50,000,000, for example,
when such taxes amount to say $40, 000,000, and actual
net corporate income is only $10,000,000, borders on
the fantastic. . . .
McLaren [1947, p., 163] notes that federal income taxes were
not treated as an allowable cost under government war contracts
during the 1940s. Federal income and excess profits taxes are
still not allowable costs under Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) 31.205-41(b) (1). The fact that federal income taxes are not
allowable costs might suggest that income taxes are an income
distribution or anomalous deduction from revenues to derive net
income rather than an expense or loss. However, state income
taxes are allowable costs under FAR 31.205-41(a) (1).21
21
The AICPA’s Audit & Accounting Guide for federal government contractors
[2007] notes that federal income taxes are not allowable (para. 2.24), but that
state income taxes are allowable costs for government contracts [para. 2.37].
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Federal and state income taxes have the same conceptual
nature although the former are not allowable whereas the latter are. Consequently, it does not make sense to maintain that
federal income taxes are an income distribution or anomalous
deduction rather than an expense, whereas state income taxes
are an expense. A more likely reason why federal income taxes
are not allowable costs is that if they were allowable, contractor
revenues and government expenditures would increase. But the
increase in government expenditures would have to be offset by
increases in income taxes for everyone. Presumably, the government finds it easier and politically more palatable to disallow
income taxes as an allowable cost of contractors rather than
increase income taxes for everyone.
Paton [1943, p. 13] alludes to a similar rationale when he
notes the similarity of sales allowances pursuant to government
contract renegotiations and income taxes during the 1940s.
Both are processes by which the government recovers excess
payments for war products. If a particular renegotiation adjustment is not made, a large part of the contested amount is still
recovered as income and excess-profits taxes. Renegotiated contract prices are properly treated as revenue deductions. According to Paton, so should income and excess-profits taxes:
. . . the artificiality of treating income and profits taxes
as a preliminary distribution of corporate profits be
comes evident. There simply are no profits in any appropriate sense – at least as far as corporate reporting
to stockholders is concerned – until the processes by
which the total governmental recovery is determined
have been fully applied.
Thus, even Paton concludes that the corporate income tax is
not an income distribution, but rather an anomalous deduction
from revenues to compute corporate net income.
Multiple Conceptualizations of Income Tax: Paton [1922, pp.
269-70, lower and upper case as in the original] suggests the
following presentation of interest, income taxes, and dividends
consistent with his entity theory viewpoint.22

22
The terminology is updated slightly to conform to modern usage by substituting retained earnings for surplus and unreserved for unappropriated. Note that
Paton favors combined income and retained earnings statements although they
are usually separate in practice.
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OPERATING NET REVENUE
Interest Earned
Fire Loss
NET REVENUE TO ALL EQUITIES, Before
Deducting Taxes
Interest on Mortgage Bonds
Interest on Debentures
Interest on Notes
[Unlabelled Subtotal]
Federal Income and Profits Taxes
[Unlabelled Subtotal]
Preferred Dividends
NET BALANCE FOR COMMON STOCK
Common Dividends
Undivided Profits
Retained Earnings, 1 January 20x3
Reserve for Contingencies
TOTAL UNRESERVED RETAINED EARNINGS,
31 December 20x3

$xxxx
xxx

$xxxx
xxx
$xxxx

$xxxx
xxx
xxx

xxx
$xxxx
xxx
$xxxx
xxx
$xxxx
xxx
$xxxx
xxx
xxx
$xxxx

Although this presentation omits a figure labeled net income, Paton’s Net Revenue to All Equities, Before Deducting [Interest and] Taxes is unequivocally his entity theory net income.23
Following Paton, some accountants [e.g., Blough, 1946, p.
89; Mason and Davidson, 1953, p. 168; AAA, 1957, p. 540] argue
that the conceptual nature of the corporate income tax depends
on the viewpoint of financial statement users. They argue that
there is no one measure of periodic net income, but rather an
array of measures for different purposes. To the stockholder, income taxes and interest on debt are properly viewed as expenses
to be deducted in computing net income available for distribution as dividends without impairing capital, consistent with
the proprietary theory. From an enterprise viewpoint, however,
Mason and Davidson [1953, p. 168] argue that net income before
income taxes and interest on debt is a more meaningful measure
of the results of operations, consistent with the entity theory.
Net income, so computed, can be more effectively compared
from one period to another and from one enterprise to another
because it is unaffected by variations in income tax policies and
debt versus equity financial policies of otherwise comparable
enterprises.
23
A consistent application of the entity theory would involve reporting corporate income taxes, along with other distributions, directly in the retained earnings
statement, rather than the income statement [e.g., Huber, 1964, pp. 27-28]. However, starting with Paton, many entity theory advocates favor reporting income
taxes in a combined income and retained earnings statement. Moreover, reporting
corporate income taxes and interest charges directly in retained earnings never
conformed to U.S. GAAP.
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Other accountants dispute this apparent resolution as no
resolution at all. For example, in criticizing the dual presentation of net income before and after income taxes, McLaren
[1947, p. 164] notes that “the owners of a business are not
concerned with any artificial sub-total, regardless of how it is
labeled. What they want to know is how much the corporation
has earned after all charges.” Kelley [1958, p. 214] also criticizes
the dual presentation as confusing. Zeff [1961, p. 160, fn. 1], in
criticizing a dual presentation of net income, asks rhetorically,
“which of the two balances is meant to be the net income? A
reader of such an income statement cannot tell.”
Sprouse [1957, p. 375] also questions the notion that “net
income before income taxes” is a more comparable metric of
enterprise profitability than “net income after income taxes.”
He notes that from a managerial viewpoint, “tax planning
represents an extremely significant factor in modern decision
making on the part of corporation managers. This would seem
to indicate that management’s primary concern is the amount
of profits after taxes rather than…before taxes.” According to
Sprouse, interperiod and interfirm profitability comparisons are
facilitated by excluding non-operating revenues and expenses
from net income, not income taxes.
Zeff [1961, pp. 213-215] offers a resolution of this issue. He
favors limiting the use of the terms “income” and “net income”
in the income statement to the return to the residual equity
common stockholders, not to other capital suppliers:
Common stockholders participate in the residuum.
Because the magnitude of their return is the most sensitive of all to the vicissitudes of enterprise success, their
natural mindfulness of swings in business activity warrants their return – if any return is to be so classified
– to be singled out as ‘income’ (preferably called ‘net
income’).
Instead of using the terms “income” or “net income” to the
other capital suppliers on the income statement, Zeff suggests
that the income statement should report “return to all capital
suppliers” and “return to preferred and common stockholders”
for these subtotals. Although Zeff’s suggestion might resolve the
issue, practice continues to use the term “net income” to refer to
“return to preferred and common stockholders,” not just “return
to residual equity” (i.e., common stockholders).
Conclusions on the Conceptual Nature of Corporate Income Taxes:
In accordance with the proprietary theory, corporate income
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taxes are typically viewed as an expense. In accordance with the
entity theory, they are typically viewed as an income distribution. However, as Wheeler and Galliart [1972, p. 55] conclude,
neither the proprietary nor the entity theory determines unambiguously the conceptual nature of corporate income taxes
because each theory leads to either ambiguous or contradictory conclusions or is interpreted differently by different writers.
Moreover, neither theory is followed consistently in practice.
Rather, as Husband [1938, pp. 252-253] noted, practice seems to
mix them, often to the point of vacillation.
Nevertheless, important lessons result from understanding
the controversies over the different theories of the accounting
entity and the conceptual nature of the corporation income
tax. Perhaps the most important lesson is to understand how
these controversies evolved in order to avoid needless entanglements over other comparable theory controversies. However,
the weight of logic leads inevitably to the conclusion that the
corporate income tax is in fact an expense, not an income distribution, loss, or anomalous item. This conclusion relies in part
on the definitions of the elements in the FASB conceptual framework and in part on the following refinement of the proprietary
and entity theories along lines suggested by Zeff.
It will be recalled that Zeff [1961, pp. 96-97] suggests that
neither the proprietary nor entity theory is completely satisfactory because neither theory fully distinguishes between the subject being accounted for and the principal party for whose benefit the financial statements are prepared. Once the proprietary
theory is applied correctly to the corporation, the corporation
becomes the subject being accounted for, not the stockholders, and the stockholders remain the principal party for whose
benefit the financial statements are prepared. Similarly, once the
entity theory is applied correctly to the corporation, the corporation remains the subject being accounted for, and the stockholders become the principal party for whose benefit the financial
statements are prepared, not the corporation or its managers.24
24
Zeff [1961, p. 107] comes to a similar conclusion but he expresses it differently. His proprietor-beneficiary version of the entity theory is essentially the
proprietary theory where the corporation becomes the subject being accounted
for and the common stockholders remain the principal party for whose benefit the
financial statements are prepared. His equities-beneficiary version of the entity
theory is essentially the entity theory where the corporation remains the subject
being accounted for and the common stockholders become the principal party
for whose benefit the financial statements are prepared. For Zeff [1961, pp. 211215], however, it is the common stockholders, not all the stockholders, who are
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As a result, when applied correctly to the corporation, the proprietary and entity theories coalesce into the same theory of the
accounting entity. The corporation is the subject being accounted for and the stockholders are the principal party for whose
benefit the financial statements are prepared. Within the context
of this coalesced proprietary-entity theory, the corporate income
tax is not an income distribution; rather, it should be deducted
from revenues and gains to derive net income attributable to the
stockholders.25
As to whether the corporate income tax deduction is an expense, a loss, or an anomalous item, the issue is best addressed
within the context of some generally accepted definition of these
items, such as the FASB’s conceptual framework.
Within that context, corporate income taxes clearly fit the
definition of an expense as an outflow of net assets resulting
from an entity’s central or peripheral operations. This conclusion presupposes several aspects of the FASB conceptual framework: (1) the financial statements should articulate with one
another; (2) a major objective of financial accounting is measuring periodic net income; (3) periodic net income comprises the
sum of the revenues and gains less the sum of the expenses and
losses; and (4) the 1985 FASB definitions of assets, liabilities,
comprehensive income, revenues, expenses, gains, and losses are
not only self-evident but also fully consistent with the coalesced
proprietary-entity theory of the accounting entity.26
Consistent with the FASB conceptual framework, the
statement of financial position reports assets, liabilities, and
stockholders’ equity as of a moment in time, while the income
statement reports revenues, expenses, gains, and losses for a
period of time. The statement of financial position reflects the
fundamental accounting equation, Assets – Liabilities = Owners’
the principal party for whose benefit the financial statements are prepared. As
such, his fused proprietary-entity theory evolves into the residual equity theory.
Kam [1990, pp. 318-320] also suggests that elements of the proprietary and entity
theories might be fused.
25
This paper purposely slights over whether the principal party for whom
financial statements are prepared should be all the stockholders or just the common stockholders. Either way, the corporate income tax should be deducted from
revenues and gains to derive net income attributable to all the stockholders under
the fused proprietary-entity theory or just the common stockholders under the
residual equity theory.
26
Presently, the FASB and IASB are jointly developing a common conceptual
framework to replace their separate conceptual frameworks. However, significant
differences between the jointly developed common conceptual framework and the
extant FASB conceptual framework are not anticipated.
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Equity under the proprietary theory, or Assets = Equities, where
equities are either liabilities or owners’ equity under the entity
theory. Because revenues, expenses, gains, and losses are defined
in terms of changes in assets and liabilities, the financial statements articulate with one another.
Under the FASB conceptual framework, comprehensive
income has four basic categories. There are no anomalous
deductions from revenues and gains to derive comprehensive
income or any intermediate component of comprehensive income. Conceivably, another two categories could be added to
derive comprehensive income, namely, anomalous additions and
anomalous deductions. However, adding two such anomalous
“what-you-may-call-its” categories, to use Sprouse’s [1966] terminology in a different context, would make the conceptualization of periodic net income more complicated than it already
is, involving six categories rather than four. Indeed, adding two
anomalous categories might make comprehensive income itself
anomalous.
The FASB conceptual framework does not encompass
anomalous items. Although the deduction or addition of income
taxes is often captioned a “provision” and reported apart from
the other expenses, it should be understood that said provision
is in the nature of an expense or, if a refund, an expense reduction, not an anomalous item. Characterizing the income tax
deduction as a provision does not change its conceptual nature
from expense to anomalous item anymore than characterizing
bad debts or warranty costs as provisions changes their conceptual nature from an expense to an anomalous item.
Manifestly, the FASB’s definition of expense as an outflow
or the using up of net assets resulting from an entity’s central
operations subsumes the definition of expense as “a cost of services consumed to obtain revenue” or, more simply, as “a cost
incurred to generate revenue.”27 Thus, the above definition of
expense reflects a coalesced proprietary-entity theory. Moreover,
the FASB definition of expense explicitly includes income taxes.
SFAS No. 109 [1992, para. 16] refers to deferred tax expense
or benefit and total tax expense or benefit, not to deferred tax

27
Chatfield [1974, p. 225] notes how the definition of expense differs under
the proprietary and entity theories. Whereas expense is simply a decrease in
stockholder’s equity or net assets under the proprietary theory, it is a cost of services consumed to obtain revenue under the entity theory. The FASB definition
subsumes the definitions under both the proprietary and entity theories.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol36/iss2/5

32

Nurnberg: Conceptual nature of the corporate income tax
Nurnberg, The Corporate Income Tax

63

provision and total tax provision.28 Similarly, in the October
16, 2008 Preliminary Views [FASB, 2008a, p. 71] document on
financial statement presentation, the illustrative statement of
comprehensive income includes a deduction captioned income
tax expense, not income tax provision or just income taxes.
The conceptual distinction between revenue versus gain
and expense versus loss relates to whether the item results
from an entity’s ongoing major or peripheral operations, not its
gross or net presentation [FASB, 1985, para. 84]. Revenue and
expense are conventionally reported gross, whereas gain and
loss are conventionally reported net. For example, sales revenue
is reported gross, excluding the related cost of goods sold. Cost
of goods sold is also reported gross, excluding the related sales
revenue. On the other hand, gain or loss on the sale of plant
assets is reported net of the depreciated cost of the plant assets
sold. Conceivably, the sale of plant assets could be reported
gross, i.e., both the selling price and the cost of the assets sold
could be reported separately as non-operating revenue and nonoperating expense respectively. Income taxes are incurred as a
result of generating revenue, a major or peripheral activity of
a business enterprise. Accordingly income taxes are an expense
because they are a cost of generating that revenue, whether
from operating revenue reported gross or from non-operating
revenue reported net. Income taxes remain in nature an expense,
whether reported gross as income tax expense when resulting
from major or peripheral activities, or reported net when resulting from discontinued operations, extraordinary items, other
comprehensive income, or prior period adjustments subject to
intraperiod income tax allocation.
Besides being defined explicitly by the FASB as an expense,
corporate income tax is an expense because it is an inevitable
outflow or using up of net assets from major or peripheral activities. Expressed more succinctly, the income tax is an expense
because it is a cost of generating operating or non-operating
revenue. Although the amount of income tax is not proportional
to any benefits received from the government, neither is the
amount of certain other costs proportional to the benefits received from payees. Yet, these other costs are unambiguously ex28
SFAS No. 109 [1992, para. 16] defines deferred tax expense or benefit as
“the change during the year in an enterprise’s deferred tax liabilities and assets,”
excluding changes in deferred tax liabilities and assets due to business acquisition
or dispositions during the year. It defines total income tax expense or benefit for
the year as “the sum of deferred tax expense or benefit and income taxes currently
payable or refundable.”
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penses, not distributions of income, losses, or anomalous items.
Examples include fixed franchise fees, property taxes, and trade
association membership fees.
Additionally, although not proportional in amount to
revenues, under interperiod income tax allocation, reported
income tax expense is roughly proportional to pretax book income, ignoring permanent differences and graduated rates, etc.
Accordingly, application of interperiod income tax allocation
bolsters the argument that corporate income tax is an expense
because its recognition is roughly proportional to the benefits received in the form of pretax book income.29 Consistent with this
observation, perhaps the method of accounting for the income
tax determines its conceptual nature rather than vice versa, illogical as this conclusion might appear.
These FASB definitions might conceivably be wrong or at
least subject to revision in a new jointly developed FASB-IASB
common conceptual framework. However, substantial changes
in these definitions are not anticipated in any new common
conceptual framework. More important, as accounting is the
language of business, some authoritative body should develop
definitions of the elements of the financial statements so that accounting communicates effectively. Presently, that job rests with
the FASB. Moreover, these definitions are essentially correct and
fully consistent with the coalesced proprietary-entity theory of
the accounting entity.
Equally important, because the objective of financial reporting is to provide information that is useful in credit and
investment decisions [SFAC-1, 1978, paras. 30-32], financial
statements should provide information needed for credit and
investment decision models. Many of these decision models are
specified in the finance literature. These models invariably treat
income taxes as an expense, not as an income distribution, loss,
or anomalous deduction. For example, Palepu et al. [2004, pp.
29
Consistent with interperiod income tax allocation, when net income before
income taxes is positive, income tax expense is usually positive, absent permanent differences, tax credits, and other items. When net income before income
taxes is negative, income tax expense is usually negative and is often described
as income tax benefit. Importantly, income tax benefit represents a reduction of
positive income tax expense, not a revenue or gain. The same is true of negative
bad debt expense due to favorable adjustments to offset overestimates of bad debt
expense of prior periods, and negative professional service expense due to favorable adjustments resulting from the overestimates of professional service expense
of prior periods or refunded amounts due to dissatisfaction with the quality of
professional services received.
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5-12], Brigham and Ehrhardt [2005, pp. 385-395], Scholes et
al. [2005, pp. 3, 394], and Penman [2007, pp. 312-315] call for
including income taxes, along with other expenses, in analyzing
cash flows, rates of return, and/or net present values in credit
and investment decisions. The usefulness of financial statements
should be enhanced by treating income taxes as expense, consistent with the way they are treated in credit and investment
decision models.
There is also some empirical evidence that viewing the corporate tax as an income distribution rather than an expense enjoys little acceptance among practicing accountants. In a survey
of 500 American CPAs, Ricchiute [1977, p. 134] reports that 191
of 234 respondents view the tax as an expense whereas only 43
view it as an income distribution. On an overall basis, Ricchiute
[1979, pp. 70, 72] reports that most of the respondents subscribe
to the proprietary theory, not the entity theory. Additionally, he
found no differences among surveyed CPAs in public accounting
contrasted to those in industry, government, or education.30
According to SFAC No. 2 [1980, paras. 40-41], understandability is an essential qualitative characteristic of accounting
information. Presumably, using the prevailing view of income
taxes as an expense enhances user understanding of financial
statements by minimizing dissonance between preparers and
users.
In conclusion, the corporate income tax is best viewed as
an expense rather than as a loss, an income distribution, or an
anomalous item. But to paraphrase van Hoepen [1981, p. 11], it
is an expense with some remarkable characteristics.
RELEVANCE OF THE CONCEPTUAL NATURE
OF INCOME TAX TO INCOME STATEMENT AND
CASH FLOW STATEMENT REPORTING
The controversy over the conceptual nature of the corporate
30
Kam [1990, p. 318] disagrees with Ricchiute’s findings. He argues that the
attitudes of stockholders, managers, and the public confirm the entity theory. Kam
appears to base his views in part on the findings of an Australian study by Moores
and Steadman [1986, pp. 23-24, 30], which found that “most practicing Australian
accountants currently subscribe to what has been called a ‘middle position,’ that
is, they exhibit a propensity to oscillate between the proprietary and entity viewpoints [theories].” Somewhat inconsistently, however, Moores and Steadman
found that “corporate accountants were slightly more disposed to middle positions and overall appeared more inclined towards proprietary viewpoints. But
when the total responses are considered, this group clustered on middle ground
while public accountants were skewed slightly to proprietary viewpoints.”
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income tax continues to impact its reporting on the income
statement and cash flow statement.
Income Statement Reporting: One secondary effect of this controversy is the location of income tax expense on the income
statement. At one time, some companies reported the income
tax among other expenses, whereas other companies reported it
separately as a separate deduction from pretax income to derive
post-tax income [AICPA, 1966, pp. 203-204; Hasselback, 1976,
p. 275]. Presently, however, almost all companies [e.g., the 2007
annual reports of Ford, p. 55; General Motors, p. 82; Procter &
Gamble, p. 49] report income taxes as a separate deduction from
pretax income from continuing operations to derive post-tax income from continuing operations.
This presentation may well reflect the carryover to the corporate annual report of the SEC’s requirement to report income
taxes separately in income statements included in annual Form
10-K reports [see Regulation S-X, 1966, section 4.08(h)]. McLaren [1947, pp. 156, 163] notes that reporting income before income taxes pursuant to SEC requirements suggests that the SEC
views the income tax as an income distribution:
It is perfectly natural for a Federal agency to view income taxes . . . as a profit-sharing arrangement in which
the government is a participant . . . in keeping with . . .
basic New Deal theories concerning the relationship . . .
between government and business.
However, the separate presentation of the income tax does
not make it a distribution or an anomalous item; it is still an
expense. Deducting income tax separately from expenses merely
facilitates user analysis of operations on a pre- and post-tax
basis. In a multiple-step income statement, cost of goods sold is
also deducted separately to facilitate analysis of gross margin; it
is still an expense.
Another secondary effect of the controversy as to the conceptual nature of the corporate income tax is the lingering controversy over interperiod income tax allocation. Some theorists
[e.g., May, 1945, p. 125; Moonitz, 1957, p. 175; Sprouse, 1957, p.
377; Davidson, 1958, p. 174; Dewhirst, 1972, p. 42; Van Hoepen,
1981, p. 12; Beechy, 1983, p. 17] suggest that interperiod income
tax allocation would not be appropriate if the corporate income
tax was really an income distribution rather than an expense.
Other theorists [e.g., Hendriksen, 1958, p. 216; Jaedicke and
Nelson, 1960, p. 278, fn. 4; Keller, 1961, pp. 29-30] argue that inhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol36/iss2/5
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terperiod allocation should be required even if income taxes are
an income distribution in order to determine income available
for distribution as dividends to stockholders without impairing
capital.
Cash Flow Statement Reporting: Questions concerning the conceptual nature of the corporate income tax may also impact its
classification in the cash flow statement. Current U.S. GAAP
classifies all income taxes as an operating flow [SFAS No. 95,
1987, paras. 91-92], except for the tax benefits from the “windfall” stock option deduction, which are classified as a financing
flow [SFAS No. 123 (Revised), 2004, para. 68].
Some theorists [e.g., Nurnberg, 1993, pp. 67-69, 2003, pp.
48-54; Turpen and Slaubaugh, 1994, pp. 35-36; Waxman, 2003,
pp.18-19] call for intraperiod income tax allocation within the
cash flow statement for the income tax effects of all investing
and financing activities in order to sharpen the distinction between operating, investing, and financing flows.
Presently, the FASB [2008a, paras. 2.21, 2.74, 2.75] proposes to report income taxes in a separate category apart from
business activities on the cash flow statement. It reasons that
allocating income taxes among operating, investing, and financing activities in those statements “would require complex and
arbitrary allocations that are unlikely to provide useful information.” Such a presentation would implicitly treat the income tax
cash flows differently from cash flows for expenses, losses, or
income distributions.
RELEVANCE OF THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE
CONCEPTUAL NATURE OF CORPORATE INCOME TAX TO
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACCOUNTING THEORY
Unless current accounting theory is understood within a
historical context, no amount of correctness, originality, rigor, or
elegance will prevent those studying it from sensing a lack of direction and meaning [cf., Schumpeter, 1954, pp. 4-5]. By studying the history of accounting thought, we learn about both the
fruitfulness and the fruitlessness of theory controversies, about
how we advance and how we regress, and about why we are as
far as we actually are but also why we are not further. Hopefully,
a better understanding of the controversy over the conceptual
nature of the corporate income tax will preclude fruitless controversies over other issues currently troubling accountants and
accounting standard setters.
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For example, a current FASB project is the conceptual distinction between liabilities and equities [FASB, 2007a]. In some
ways, this controversy is similar to the one over the conceptual
nature of the corporate income tax, which in turn relates to the
conceptual distinctions between expenses and distributions. Despite an extensive literature extending over almost a century, the
controversy over the conceptual nature of the corporate income
tax remains unresolved, largely because the conceptual distinctions between expenses and income distributions are not always
unambiguous. Perhaps there is little reason to expect the FASB
to be more successful in distinguishing between liabilities and
equities, judging by its recent somewhat unsuccessful efforts at
ascertaining the conceptual nature of mandatorily redeemable
preferred stock.
Another example is the current FASB project on the reporting entity, including its associated theories. Perhaps there is little
reason to expect the FASB to be more successful in developing a
more workable concept of the reporting entity, judging by its
somewhat unsuccessful and incomplete efforts over more than
23 years to develop a more workable concept of the consolidated
entity.
Still another example is the current efforts of the FASB and
IASB to make accounting more consistent by developing and refining a common conceptual framework. The FASB commenced
initial efforts on developing a conceptual framework in 1972.
Although some of its members suggest that its extant conceptual
framework is helpful in its own deliberations on new accounting
standards, to date the framework is far from complete, far from
internally consistent, and far from conceptual throughout, as is
the joint FASB-IASB proposed common conceptual framework.
Perhaps the world of accounting and business would be better
off by following Boulding’s [1962, p. 54] suggestion to educate
report users and the public as to what accountants do rather
than developing new and potentially more complex and more
obtuse conceptual frameworks.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper examines a long-standing controversy about the
conceptual nature of the corporate income tax. This controversy
remains unresolved, despite several authoritative pronouncements stating or assuming that the corporate income tax is an
expense, and despite an extensive discussion in the literature
over more than one hundred years. This controversy in part
reflects different theories of the accounting entity.
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Within the context of a coalesced proprietary-entity theory
of the accounting entity, the examination of this controversy
leads to the unsurprising conclusion that the corporate income
tax is an expense, but an expense with some remarkable characteristics. However, the benefits from examining this controversy
extend beyond the conclusion that the income tax is an expense.
The examination provides a historical context in which other
theory controversies can be examined to greater advantage. It
shows how the development of accounting thought has progressed and regressed. It teaches us much about the ways of the
human mind. Perhaps a better understanding of this controversy may preclude fruitless controversies over other accounting
theory issues currently troubling accountants and accounting
standard setters.
Additionally, the controversy as to the conceptual nature of
the corporate income tax impacts its reporting on the income
statement and cash flow statement. One manifestation of this
controversy is the lingering controversy over interperiod tax
allocation. Another manifestation of this controversy is how to
report income taxes on the income and cash flow statements.
No doubt some readers will disagree with the conclusion
that the corporate income tax is an expense. To some readers,
the tax defies conceptualization. Perhaps the same is true of
other conceptual issues currently troubling accounting standard
setters. For decades, standard setters have called for the development of a conceptual framework to help facilitate the development of financial accounting standards. But, as indicated by the
controversy over the corporate income tax, some things are not
easily conceptualized in the real world.
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